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that a Joint Action on airport transit visas fell within the scope of Article 100c of
the EC Treaty (as it then was), rather than Title VIEU, but the Court did rule that
it had jurisdiction to consider the case. It found that Article M of the EU Treaty
(now Article 47 EU, and not amended by the Amsterdam Treaty) gave it power to
determine whether a third pillar measure should have been adopted in the first
pillar, and to annul the measure if it "encroached" upon an EC Treaty power.
There may well be similar such disputes in future.'" Moreover, the boundary
between Title IV EC and the "mainstream" EC Treaty may become highly
contested, given the different roles of the institutions and different territorial
scope of the two. In another case, the Court ruled that the Council's Decision on
access to documents covered third pillar documents, and that moreover it had
jurisdiction to rule on the application of the Decision to those documents.40
Finally, the Court ruled on the validity of internal border controls maintained by
member States, finding that Article 7a EC (now Article 14) lacked direct effect
and that the right of EU citizens to "move and reside freely" did not preclude
member States demanding to see their passports.41
C. Conclusion
The Amsterdam Treaty's creation of an area of "Freedom, Security and Justice"
began with an early allocation of the Schengen acquis, a raft of proposed
legislative measures, and a reorganisation of the EC institutions. The Council and
Commission also agreed a very detailed Action Plan on implementing the new
Area,42 and a European Council was called for October 1999 in Tampere to
discuss implementation further. It remains to be seen whether the Council will
overcome the political deadlock which characterised much of the Maastricht-era
third pillar, and whether post-Amsterdam JHA measures will take greater
account of civil liberties, human rights and criminal justice principles than their
predecessors.
STEVE PEERS*
III. COMPETITION
A. Cartels
The period under review (Spring 1998—Autumn 1999) is one in which the
prohibition of cartels under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty figured prominently,
the Court of Justice clearing up a backlog of unfinished business relating back, in
some cases, over a decade. The 1986 Polypropylene cartel decision1 was finally put
39. The Commission has already argued that the proposed third pillar Decision on
counterfeit travel documents (supra n.20) falls within the first pillar.
40. Case T-174/95 Svenska Joumatistforbundet [1998] E.CR. 11-2289.
41. Case C-378/97, judgment of 21 Sept 1999 (not yet reported).
4Z OJ. 1999, C19/1.
* Reader in Law, Human Rights Centre, and Director, Centre for European Commer-
cial Law, University of Essex.
1. Decision 86/398 (1986) OJ. L230/1.
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to bed with the Court of Justice dismissing a number of appeals raised on the sole
ground of the non-existence of the decision.2 It also dismissed an appeal involving
the 1989 Welded Steel Mesh cartel decision3 except that, in an important
development, for the first time the Court expressly applied Article 6(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides a right to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time before an impartial tribunal, and reduced
a Commission fine (marginally, knocking 50,000 ECUs off a 3 million ECU fine)
as "reasonable satisfaction" for the excessive duration of proceedings (five-and-a-
half years) before the Court of First Instance.4 The Court of First Instance itself
upheld on review the 1994 Commission decision in the Cartonboard cartel,5
leaving of major cartel cases only review of the Cement decision still outstanding.6
The notorious 1989 PVC cartel decision7 was found to be non-existent by the
Court of First Instance in 1992 because of the shambles of Commission
procedure.Svhich finding was overturned on appeal by the Court of Justice but
which annulled the decision for procedural flaws in 1994.' Immediately thereafter
the Commission simply rcadoptcd the original decision,10 recycling measures and
procedures preparatory to the first (annulled) decision but this time paying closer
attention to its own procedural rules on its final adoption by the college of
Commissioners, and in April 1999 the Court of First Instance found that this was
not improper in terms of res judicata, that neither any rule of prescription nor any
rights of defence had been infringed, and this time sustained the Commission."
The judgment has been appealed,12 and the Court of Justice may take a less
generous view of Commission procedural liberties.
A number of companies censured and fined by the Commission in the 1985
Woodpulp cartel decision13 declined at the time to challenge it before the Court
and simply paid up. When the decision was eventually annulled for the most part
in 1993 in proceedings raised by various other addressees,14 the former raised an
action claiming that the annulment ought to apply equally to them and the
Commission ought to reimburse the fines paid. The Court of Justice has now
confirmed, reversing the Court of First Instance in part, that a Commission
decision and fine under Regulation 17 is definitive and binding upon an addressee
which fails to raise review proceedings under Article 230, even if it is annulled by
2. In a number of judgments the first of which is Case C-49/92P Commission v. Anic
Panecipaiione, judgment of 8 Jul. 1999, not yet reported.
3. Decision 89/515 (1989) OJ. L260/1.
4. Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe v. Commission [1998] E.CR. 1-8417.
5. Decision 94/601 (1994) OJ. L234/14, upheld in a number of judgments the first of
which is Case T-295/94 Buchmann v. Commission [1998] E.CR. 11-813.
6. Decision 94/815 (1994) OJ. L343/1, under review as Cases T-25 etcJ95 Cimenuries
CBR and On. v. Commission, pending.
7. Decision 89/190 (1989) OJ. L74/1.
8. Cases T-79 etcJ89 BASF and On v. Commission [1992] E.CR. 11-315.
9. Case C-137/92P Commission v. BASF and On [1994] E.CR. 1-2555.
10. Decision 94/599 (1994) OJ. L234/14.
11. Cases T-305 etc/94 Umburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and On. v. Commission,
judgment of 20 Apr. 1999, not yet reported
12. Case C-238/99P Umburgie Vinyl Maatschappij v. Commission, pending.
13. Decision 85/202 (1995) OJ. L85/1.
14. Cases 89 etc785 Ahlstrdm and On. v. Commission [1993] E.CR. 1-1307.
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means of proceedings raised by other addressees, and it has no claim upon the
Commission to reconsider the matter.15
B. Article 81(2)
Article 81(2) of the Treaty provides that agreements which fall within the
prohibition of Article 81(1) are "automatically void". Surprisingly, its legal
consequences have been left largely to be determined in accordance with national
contract law. Note ought to be taken of two recent judgments of the English Court
of Appeal. The first, in Passmore v. Morland16 determined that the automatic
nullity of Article 81(2) is of a temporaneous or transient character a contract
which is void for breach of Article 81(1), even if void at its formation, is
nevertheless not void ab initio, and so if owing to a change in circumstances the
prohibition ceases to apply to it the contract will cease to be void and becomes
valid and enforceable. Litigants in other member states may press their courts to
emulate the Court of Appeal, but it seems unlikely that the contract law of many
other national legal systems could accommodate the same conclusion. Second, the
Court of Appeal has now settled that a contract prohibited by Article 81(1) is in
English law not only void but illegal, so that a party to it has no claim to recover
any loss either in reparation or in restitution." However in Crehan v. Courage it
accepted that the Court of Justice may take a different view and so has referred
the question to it under Article 234. This will afford the Court the opportunity to
provide (much needed) guidance on the ambit and application of Article 81(2).
C. Joint Dominance
The principle that undertakings which are not themselves dominant but which
with other undertakings occupy a "joint" or "collective" dominant position and so
fall subject to the discipline of Article 82, first recognise in Flat Glass,™ continues
to be developed. It also continues to increase in importance as more oligopolistic
markets are created or evolve. The most recent judicial pronouncement is that in
Irish Sugar, in which the Commission found a joint dominant position held by an
Irish dominant undertaking and its sole Irish distributor where the two were
linked by the former's equity interest in and representation on the board of the
latter and the variety of economic ties between them"—also noteworthy as the
first and only case which libels the existence of joint dominance as a function of
vertical, not horizontal, links. On review the Court of First Instance upheld the
Commission in all essentials;2Othe fact of a vertical, and not horizontal, relation-
ship was immaterial.21 Further, the Court for the first time provides a provisional
answer to the question of whether an undertaking which is collectively (but not
15. Case C-310/97P Commission v. AssiDomOn Kraft Products, judgment of 14 Sept.
1999, not yet reported.
16. [1999] EU.L.R. 501.
17. Cibbs Mew v. CemmeU [1998] Eu.LR. 588; Trent Taverns v. Sykes [1999] Eu.LR.
492; Crehan v. Courage, judgment of 27 May 1999, not yet reported.
18. Cases T-68,77 & 78/89 Sodetd itaUano Vetro v. Commission [1992] E.GR. 11-1403.
19. Decuion 97/624 (1997) OJ. L258/32.
20. Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v. Commission, judgment of 7 Oct. 1999, not yet reported.
21. atpara.63.
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individually) dominant can abuse that position unilaterally or whether exploita-
tive abuse arise only in joint conduct:
"Whilst the existence of a joint dominant position may be deduced from the position
which the economic entities concerned together hold on the market in question, the
abuse does not necessarily have to be the action of all the undertakings in question. It
only has to be capable of being identified as one of the manifestations of such a joint
dominant position being held. Therefore, undertakings occupying a joint dominant
position may engage in joint or individual abusive conduct. It is enough for the
abusive conduct to relate to the exploitation of the joint dominant position which the
undertakings hold on the market."23
As a general principle this must however be treated with caution. The joint
dominance aspects of Irish Sugar (there were others in which it was not at issue)
were established by a vertical relationship between producer and distributor. But
since a vertical relationship will be entered into only for mutual advantage it
is much easier to find pursuit of a common policy—a necessary test for
joint dominance—which is a function ("one of the manifestations") of the joint
dominance within that context. It will be more difficult to show where joint
dominance and abuse thereof exists on the horizontal plane. For that, further
elucidation may come with the appeal judgment in Compagnie Maritime Beige
which is still awaited.23
D. Mergers
Following the 1997 amendments to the Merger Regulation (in force March
1998)Mthe number of notifications has, as expected, risen significantly, to 23S in
1998 (up from 172 in 1997) and 209 in the first nine months of 1999. Three
concentrations were vetoed outright,23 bringing the total since the entry into force
of the Regulation in 1990 to 11. The first fines were imposed under the Regulation,
for unintentional26 and "grossly negligent"27 failure to notify and nonetheless
proceed with a concentration and for supplying incomplete information in a
notification,2* and for the first time a decision by a national government
purporting to prohibit a concentration with a Community dimension was
suspended by the Commission;19 enforcement proceedings raised under Article
226 against the member State in question (Portugal) for breach of Community law
(i.e. the Merger Regulation) are now in train. In Gencor the Court of First
Instance reaffirmed that the Regulation could be applied to prohibit a concen-
tration which produced not single but joint (in casu duopolistic) dominance, also
noteworthy in its extraterritorial aspects in that the merger in question involved
22. atpara.66.
23. Cases C-395 A. 396/96P Compagnie Maritime Beige v. Commission, pending.
24. Reg.1310/97 (1997) OJ. L180/1; see discussion at (1998) 47 I.CLQ. 717.
25. Decision 1999/153 (Beneismann/Kirch/Premiere) OJ. 1999 L53/1; Decision 1999/154
(Deutsche Telekom/BetaRaearch) OJ. 1999 L53/3 1; Case M.1524 (Ainours/Fmt Choice),
decision of 22 Sept 1999, not yet published.
26. Decision 1999/594 (Samsung/AST Research lnc) (1999) OJ. L225/12.
27. Decision 1999/459 (A. P. Mfiller) (1999) OJ. L183/29.
28. Case M.1497 (Sanofi/Synthilabo), decision of 28 Jul. 1999, not yet published.
29. Case M.1616 (Banco Santander Centro Hispanw/Champalimaud), decision of 20 Jul.
1999, not yet published.
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South African mining interests and had previously been approved by the South
African Competition Board.30 Finland has now adopted its own merger control
legislation,31 leaving only Denmark and Luxembourg without and so little
likelihood of further references of national mergers to the Commission under
Article 22(3) of the Regulation ("the Dutch clause").
E. Reform of Regulation 17
The most important developments in competition law are those addressing the
reform of enforcement procedures—remarkable not only for their breadth but
also their author, a Commission which had resigned en masse and so ought, on one
view, to be discharging caretaker functions only until replaced. Since 1997 the
Commission has adopted a new benevolence towards vertical agreements—those
which impose restraints upon competition but are agreements between or
amongst undertakings at different levels on the production or distribution chain.37
The present fruits of this change of heart are two: first, Article 4(2) of Regulation
17,Mwhich exempts certain agreements from the obligation of notification to the
Commission in order to gain exemption from Article 81(1) of the Treaty, has been
amended by the Council14 so that it applies now to all vertical agreements
regulating conditions of sale or re-sale, even if two or more undertakings are party
to them, and including the marketing of services. The primary advantage of
Article 4(2) is that it allows for exemption without notification and, if notified,
retroactive exemption effective from the date of conclusion of the agreement. The
amendment, conferring this advantage upon a very large number of agreements,
therefore increases appreciably its practical significance and, owing to the
possibility of retroactive exemption, the difficulties facing national courts, when
considering the lawfulness of an Article 4(2) agreement, of the type considered by
the Court of Justice in Delimitis?* Second, the basic Regulation governing block
exemptions (Regulation 19)36 has been amended by the Council37 so as to
authorise the Commission to adopt a block exemption regulation applying to
vertical agreements to which any number of undertakings are party on the
purchase, sale or re-sale of goods and services. Using this new power the
Commission has now proposed a single block exemption regulation31 which is
intended to replace the present vertical block exemptions (exclusive distribution,
exclusive purchasing, franchising) which are scheduled to expire at the end of
30. Case T-102/96 Gencor v. Commission, judgment of 25 Mar. 1999, not yet reported;
this judgment is discussed in 172.
31. Laki Kilapailunrajoituksista 11-11 i S (303/1998), in force 1 Oct 1998.
32. See the Commission Green Paper on vertical restraints in competition policy,
COM(96)721 final; Follow-Up to the Green Paper on vertical restraints: Communication on
the application of the Community competition rules to vertical restraints, (1998) OJ.
C365/3.
33. Reg.17/62 (1962) J.O. 24.
34. Reg.1216/1999 (1999) OJ. L148/5.
35. Case C-234/89 Delimisis v. Henninger Brdu [1991] E.C.R. 1-935.
36. Reg.19/65 (1965) J.O. 533.
37. Reg.121571999 (1999) OJ. L148/1.
38. Draft Commission Regulation on the application of Art.81(3) of the EC Treaty to
categories of vertical agreements and restrictive practices, not yet published
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1999 and which will apply to vertical agreements as so described except those
involving (a) a supplier which along with connected undertakings enjoys a
combined market share exceeding 30 per cent of the relevant market,39 (b) an
association of distributors with a combined annual turnover exceeding € 50
million40and (c) competing undertakings (entering into a non-reciprocal vertical
agreement) where the buyer is a manufacturer (and not merely a distributor) with
an annual turnover exceeding € 100 million.41 The draft regulation provides a
"black list" excluding certain hardcore restraints such as the imposition of fixed or
minimum resale prices, certain resale conditions and forms of territorial
protection, "non-compete" clauses except of short duration and restraints
following termination of the agreement,42 but unlike all presently existing block
exemptions it sets out no white list. The Commission and national competition
authorities (which can show within their territory the characteristics of a distinct
geographic market) may withdraw the benefits of exemption in a particular case
where a vertical agreement falling within the regulation nevertheless produces
effects incompatible with Article 81(3);" the Commission may do so with blanket
effect, by regulation and without showing incompatibility with Article 81(3),
where parallel networks of similar vertical restraints cover more than SO percent
of a relevant market.44 If adopted the regulation will, says the Commission, create
a "safe harbour" for vertical agreements,49 especially for parties which are small
and medium sized undertakings, and allow for a greater degree of suppleness,
lessening the "straightjacket" effect of present block exemptions, without
sacrificing legal certainty.4'
Important though these changes are, they pale in comparison with (and may be
rendered otiose by) the Commission White Paper produced in April 1999 and
proposing significant further reform to the enforcement of the competition
rules,"amongst which are fundamental changes to the application of Article
81(3). Since the adoption by the Council of Regulation 17 in 1962 the Commission
has enjoyed a monopoly on the power to grant exemption under Article 81(3) to
agreements which offend Article 81(1).** According to the White Paper, this
monopoly, and the consequent plethora of notifications to it, has been justified in
order to enable the Commission to establish the uniform meaning and parameters
of Article 81(1)—"to build up a coherent body of precedent cases, and to ensure
that the competition rules are applied consistently throughout the member
States".49Now however, following more than 35 years of Commission activity and
39. Draft Reg., art2(l).
40. Art.l(2).
41. Art.1(4). The Commission had proposed that this be written into Reg.19 (Com-
mission proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation No.19/65, COM(98)546
final) but on it the regulation remained silent
42. ArU3,4.
43. Artt.5,6.
44. Art.7.
45. Draft Guidelines on vertical restraints attached to the Draft Regulation, Chap.HI 1.
46. COM(98)546 final, Explanatory Memorandum.
47. White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Arts.85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty, Programme No.99/027.
48. Reg.17, art.9(l).
49. White Paper, para.76.
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case law of the Court of Justice the law is "clarified" and "more predictable",50 it
consists of a "set of clear rules"31 and the conditions for exemption under Article
81(3) "have been largely clarified by case-law and decision-making practice and
are known to undertakings".52 The centralised system of Regulation 17 is
therefore "cumbersome, inefficient and impose[s] excessive burdens on economic
operators'^and is "no longer consistent with the effective supervision of
competition".54 The White Paper therefore supports the adoption of a "directly
applicable exemption system" and "ex post control"55 whereby legislation
adopted under Article 83 would scrap the notification system (except for partial
function production joint ventures, at present subject to Article 81 but which will
be absorbed into the Merger Regulation56) and require that all national
competition authorities and all national courts before which Article 81(1) was
raised also apply Article 81(3). The whole of Article 81, sundered by Regulation
17, would therefore be reunited, parties could rely directly upon Article 81(3), and
restrictive practices prohibited by Article 81(1) but which meet the criteria of
Article 81(3) would be valid and enforceable from the time they were concluded
without need of a prior decision to that effect. Similarly, restrictive practices
which meet the criteria of Article 81(3) and so are valid ab initio would cease to be
valid if, and at the point at which, the conditions for exemption were no longer
fulfilled. In other words, Article 81(3) would become directly effective.
This is a bold turn indeed. It must be read as an admission—according to the
president of the Bundeskartellamt, "capitulation"57—that administration of the
present system is well beyond the Commission's resources and so ability. If the
White Paper is followed up it will be freed from its present onerous task of
processing notifications and so allow it to concentrate its resources in other areas
as it sees fit. But it will also self evidently mark a far reaching change to the
enforcement of Article 81. The concurrent reform of the block exemption system
for example, which is stated to be a complement to the White Paper proposals,
prima facie makes no sense if Article 81(3) is to become directly effective. The
Commission view is that it has a utility as a means of denning more precisely the
scope of Article 81(3); but it is inevitable that there will be disharmony between
the Commission view of Article 81(3) and that of various national competition
authorities and courts. In fact, only eight member states have administrative
competition authorities competent to enforce Articles 81 and 82; if the White
Paper is to be effective the other seven will be required to create them. But once
created, there is no guarantee they will pursue anticompetitive conduct with the
vigour, with the impartiality, or in the same manner as the Commission would
wish. Whilst the White Paper canvasses certain safeguards (exchanges of
information and files, an option of Commission intervention before national
50. Para.48.
51. ParaJl.
52. Para.78.
53. Para.42.
54. Para.9.
55. Paras.69ff.
56. Paras.79-«1.
57. "Perspcktiven des Europfiischen Kartellrechts", a position paper delivered by Dr
Dieter Wolf to the Frankfurter Institut—Stiftung Marktwirtschaft und Politik, 8 Jul. 1999.
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courts as amicus curiae, amendments to Regulation 17 or its successor and
codification of various modi operandi in notices), the proposals will necessarily
bring about fundamental problems of regulating the relationship amongst the
Commission, national competition authorities and national courts and imperil the
uniform application of the law. Whether Commission confidence in the maturity
of the system is well founded and whether upon reflection it is sufficient to justify
letting the genie out of the bottle remains to be seen.
ROBERT LANE*
IV. EXCISE, V A T A N D CUSTOMS
A. Excise and VAT
One of the major activities of the European Community for achieving its
objectives is to establish an internal market characterised by the abolition, as
between member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital.1
The Community was required to adopt measures with the aim of progressively
establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, in
accordance with, and subject to, the provisions of the EC Treaty.2 That aim was
substantially achieved, but some measures necessary for the better functioning of
the internal market could either not be agreed before that date or, if they had been
agreed, could not, for commercial or political reasons, be implemented
immediately.
Two such measures which were agreed before 31 December 1992 but which, for
commercial or political reasons could not be implemented immediately after that
date, concerned measures dealing with the incidence of excise duty and VAT in
respect of goods sold in tax-free shops at ports and airports and at the terminals of
the Channel tunnel to persons intending to make a journey from one member
State to another (an intra-Community journey), or sold to passengers on a ship or
aircraft in the course of an intra-Community journey.
There is clearly scope for debate whether the excise duty chargeable on such
goods or the VAT chargeable on the supply of such goods should be that of the
member State of departure of the passenger or of the member State of his arrival,
but it is equally clear that it is anomalous for such goods to be completely free of
duty and VAT within an internal market.
However, it was agreed that a further period of time was required after 31
December 1992 before such duty- and VAT-free treatment could be abolished, in
order to allow measures to be taken to alleviate both the economic repercussions
in the sectors concerned and regional difficulties, particularly in border regions
between member States. That further period of time was set, at the outset, to
• Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh.
1. EC Treaty, Arts.2 (ex Art.2) and 3.1(c) (ex ArtJ(c)).
2. Ibid. Art 14 (ex Art7a).
